



Aids and Society Research Unit
The antiretroviral moratorium in the 
Free State Province of South Africa: 
Contributing factors and implications
Rebecca Hodes
Anna Grimsrud
CSSR Working Paper No. 290
March 2011
Rebecca Hodes is the Deputy Director of the AIDS and Society Research Unit in the 
Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town, South Africa.
Anna Grimsrud is a Lecturer in the Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and 
Research, University of Cape Town, South Africa.
Thank you to Jonathan Berger, Brian Honnerman, Nicoli Nattrass and Helen Schneider 
for their many helpful comments on earlier drafts and aspects of this article. We are also 
grateful for the inputs of our audience members at a seminar in the Centre for Social 
Science Research. We acknowledge the work of Peter Barron and the other members 
of the Integrated Support Team for their report on the Free State, which informed much 
of our further research for this article. Any remaining errors are our own.
1 
 
The antiretroviral moratorium in the 
Free State Province of South Africa: 






In November 2008, a moratorium on initiating new patients onto antiretroviral 
(ARV) treatment was enacted by the Provincial Department of Health in the 
Free State province of South Africa. The moratorium, which was part of a series 
of cost curtailment measures, lasted for four months. During this time, an 
estimated thirty additional patients in the province died from AIDS each day. 
The moratorium contradicted national government’s commitment to scaling-up 
of ARV treatment to 80% of those in need by 2011. This article uses the health 
systems components outlined by Harries et al. as crucial to the delivery of 
quality care as a conceptual framework to assess the causal elements of the 
antiretroviral moratorium. It examines the factors that contributed to the 
moratorium, including poor financial management systems, human resource 
and equipment shortages, weak monitoring and evaluation systems, and 
bureaucratic malfunctioning. This article describes South Africa’s system of 
fiscal federalism and its impact on health budgeting. As the first official 
cessation of provincial roll-out, the moratorium served as a litmus test for 
government’s reaction to critical challenges in the expansion of the ARV 
treatment programme at both national and provincial levels. It therefore 
provides a valuable case study for the state’s response to some of the systematic 
and health infrastructural problems that have characterised South Africa’s ARV 






HIV and ARV treatment in South Africa 
 
South Africa has the largest HIV epidemic in the world with approximately 5.7 
million people living with the virus (UNAIDS 2008).
 
By the end of 2010, over 1 
million people in South Africa have initiated antiretroviral (ARV) treatment 
(Republic of South Africa 2010).
 
Despite the scale-up of public access to ARVs 
subsequent to government‟s commitment to the Operational Plan on 
Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Care, Management and Treatment (2003), the 
state continues to confront the dual legacies of apartheid‟s inequitable 
distribution of health resources, and the failure of the post-apartheid state to 
control the epidemic (McIntyre et al. 1995; Coovadia et al. 2009: 831).
 
The 
AIDS denialism of President Thabo Mbeki and Health Minister Tshabalala-
Msimang obstructed South Africa‟s public provision of ARVs (Baleta 1999: 
1711; Cohen 2000: 590-1), and delays to South Africa‟s ARV roll-out resulted in 
the unnecessary loss of over 330,000 lives during Mbeki‟s presidential tenure 




Before South Africa‟s democratic transition, the senior management of the 
public health sector was highly centralised and cronyist. After 1994, 
government transformed the National Health Department by pursuing a policy 
of affirmative action, with an associated loss of institutional memory and 
problems relating to a lack of experience among senior management (Coovadia 
et al. 2009: 831). Government also issued numerous policies aimed at 
alleviating human resource shortages that compromised the delivery of health 
services, particularly at primary levels (ibid: 830).
 
However, these policies were 
not implemented effectively, and by the close of the 1990s there were 
substantial reductions in the nurse-to-population ratio and the percentage of 




The erosion of accountability within the Health Department and a lack of 
experience, professional development and support under successive Health 
Ministers detracted further from the Department‟s ability to integrate national 
health policies with provincial and local implementation plans. Weaknesses 
within the public health sector were demonstrated by the gross financial 
mismanagement which emerged across the three tiers of government – national, 
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 In 1998, there were 149 public sector nurses per 100,000 of the population. By 2007, this 
had fallen to 110 per 100,000 population in 2007. The percentage of doctors working within 
the private sector rose from 40% in the 1980s to 79% in 2007, and external migration remains 
at high levels. 
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provincial and local. By the financial year 2008/09, all provinces were 
experiencing severe problems with their health budgets. The AIDS Law 
Project,2 claimed that financial mismanagement had resulted in a total health 




ARVs service delivery in the Free State 
 
The National Health Act (2003) commits the National Department of Health to 
playing an oversight role in relation to Provincial Health Departments, such as 
approving business plans and monitoring their implementation (Republic of 
South Africa 2004). However, priorities for health programmes determined at 
national level are not necessarily aligned with capacity at provincial and district 
levels. In the provincial rollout of ARVs, provinces have been left to develop 
their own targets for patient initiation and the broader scale-up of health 
services. At the end of 2008, when the ARV moratorium was enacted in the Free 
State, the province had no methodology by which it set treatment targets and 
aligned these with budgets. The Free State also has the lowest rates of provincial 
ARV treatment coverage, at only 25% of those eligible for treatment accessing 




From 2005, the provincial scale-up of ART programmes across South Africa‟s 
nine provinces began in earnest. In the absence of guidelines, norms or 
standards issued by the National Department of Health, the Free State 
developed its own systems for scale-up (Schneider et al. 2010: 13).
 
The 
province struggled to initiate patients onto ARVs quickly enough to meet the 
high demand for treatment, and its model of ARV provision through a small 
number of centrally located clinics meant that treatment remained inaccessible 
for many. This was partly the result of the laborious accreditation process for 
ARV sites, and partly because of human resource shortages and infrastructural 
constraints.3
 
The concentration of services in urban centres meant that many 
patients had to travel long distances to access care, and lengthy waiting lists at 
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 An public interest law centre and monitoring group, now called Section27 (in reference to 
the section in South African Constitution that outlines the state‟s commitments to socio-
economic rights).  
3
 The accreditation process was implemented under Tshabalala-Msimang, and prevented the 
decentralisation of ARV treatment to public health clinics. It was initially meant to ensure 
that ARV clinics had adequate medical resources, i.e. a doctor, nurse, voluntary counselling 
and testing and laboratory facilities. However, accreditation soon became another bulwark to 
ART provision due to its requirements of a dietician and social worker. Public health workers 
and activists saw the finer criteria as being fulfilled once the roll-out gained momentum, but 
the Health Department insisted that, for an ARV treatment site to be accredited, all 
requirements had to be met rather and not just the necessities. 
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central facilities indicated the high unmet demand for ARVs. Between May 
2004 and December 2007, one quarter of patients on the province‟s ARV 
waiting list died before accessing treatment (Ingle et al. 2010: 3). 
 
 
Changes in national government’s HIV 
response 
 
In September 2008, President Thabo Mbeki resigned his position and Kgalema 
Motlanthe assumed the presidency for the remainder of the parliamentary term. 
In the same month as his succession, Motlanthe replaced Health Minister 
Tshabalala-Msimang with Barbara Hogan, who was known for her financial 
acuity and her support for evidence-based health interventions. Her appointment 
was therefore perceived as a turn-around for the Department of Health and a 
sign of its mounting of new, evidence-based, effective responses to HIV. (BBC 
2008).  
 
In October 2008, Hogan gave a speech at the opening of the International AIDS 
Vaccine Conference announcing that South Africa had the largest ARV 
programme in the world (Hogan 2008). Recent data highlights the rapid pace of 
ARV treatment scale-up, with a 12-fold increase in the number of patients 
initiating ARVs since 2002/03 (Cornell et al. 2010: 2266). With scale-up, there 
is evidence that ARV treatment coverage is improving as patients are enrolling 
for treatment with less advanced disease (ibid: 2265). From 2004 onwards, ARV 
provision has also reduced AIDS mortality and the number of maternal orphans 
in South Africa (Johnson 2009). 
 
Despite the rapid expansion of ARV treatment coverage, the Department of 
Health indicated that, in 2008, less than half of adults eligible for ARVs were in 
fact on treatment (Republic of South Africa 2010).  In 2006, Nattrass (2008: 
398-406) has argued that South Africa‟s ARV coverage was relatively low in the 
context of its development, demographic characteristics and institutional 
capacity.
 
Despite the state‟s considerable expenditure on health and the 
existence of a range of supportive policies, by the end of the 1990s a number of 
South Africa‟s health outcomes were worsening (Chopra et al. 2009: 1025).  
Since 1994, life expectancy had declined by almost 20 years, largely because of 
the rise in HIV-related mortality (ibid: 1023, Bradshaw et al. 2004: 278–9). 
Epidemics of communicable and non-communicable diseases increased 
demands for health services at a time in which human resources and funding 
decreased, and poor management compromised the functioning of the public 
health sector further (Barron et al. 2009).  
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Concern regarding poor budgeting practices within the public health sector 
came to the fore in November 2008 when, despite Health Minister Hogan‟s 
commitments to better financial oversight and to the expansion of ARV 
coverage, a moratorium on initiating new patients onto ARVs was implemented 
in the Free State province. The moratorium, together with the broader health 
overspend across Provincial and National Health Departments, led Health 
Minister Hogan to commission an investigation into the financial and 
operational practices that continued to deplete health budgets and accrue 
massive overspends. An investigative taskforce called the „Integrated Support 
Team‟ was formed under the leadership of the ex-Deputy Auditor-General, and 
visited every province to consult with chief financial officers, auditors, accounts 
general, Members of Executive Council (MECs) for Health and heads of 
department to ascertain the chief cost drivers in health. 
 
The Task Team began its review of the Free State Department of Health in 
March 2009, and submitted a report to Minister Hogan in April 2009. Shortly 
thereafter, President Jacob Zuma appointed Aaron Motsoaledi as the new 
Minister of Health, replacing Hogan. Despite the persistent requests by health 
advocacy and monitoring groups for public access to the report, it was kept 
under embargo by the Department of Health until June 2010 (although the 
report had been leaked to key figures within the HIV advocacy sphere and 






Harries et al. (2009) outline six elements of a health system that are crucial to 
the functioning and delivery of quality care. These are: (1) adequate numbers of 
skilled human resources, (2) good physical infrastructure, (3) sound financial 
management, (4) reliable monitoring and evaluation (M&E), (5) good 
leadership and stewardship, and (6) efficient procurement and distribution of 
health commodities (Harries et al. 2009: 1194-1199). This article uses these six 
elements as a conceptual framework with which to assess the contributing 
factors to the Free State‟s ARV moratorium. This research indicates that a crisis 
in financial management catalysed the breakdown of health service delivery that 
resulted ultimately in the ARV moratorium. It describes how the source of this 
crisis may be found in the failure of fiscal decentralisation within the public 
health sector, and the weak integration and functioning of South Africa‟s fiscal 




The co-authors used interdisciplinary research methods to collate and assess 
data on the contributing factors and implications of the ARV moratorium. 
Health systems research, with a particular focus on the role of implementation 
management, and analyses of the impacts of fiscal decentralisation on the public 
health sector in South Africa, were combined with primary, documentary 
research. The principal source for this research was the report of the Integrated 
Task Team, based on a detailed analysis of the Free State‟s budgeting practises 
and on interviews with key informants in the Provincial Department of Health 
and Treasury (Barron et al. 2009: 15 – 16). Other primary documentary sources 
included key legislation concerning public expenditure and health services; 
memoranda and correspondence from Free State and National Department of 
Health officials; reports by the HIV Clinicians Society of Southern Africa, AIDS 





‘Stop putting new clients on ARVs’ 
 
On 3 November 2008, the head of the Free State‟s Comprehensive HIV and 
AIDS Management Programme emailed the provinces Chief ARV Pharmacist 
with an instruction in the subject line to „Stop putting new clients on ARVs‟. 
The email stated: 
This province (FS) is experiencing an acute shortage of 
antiretroviral drugs…This will lead to clients on treatment 
defaulting not because of their own fault. The only way to avoid 
this is by keeping the remaining ARVs for the exclusive use of 
those on treatment already with the exception of clients on the 
PMTCT program (pregnant women). In the meantime the FSDoH 
(Free State Department of Health) will be trying to find ways to 
remedy this situation (Tshabalala 2008). 
 
The Chief ARV pharmacist forwarded this email to healthcare workers and 
facility managers, acknowledging its serious implications:  
We are facing a difficult period. You at the sites are faced with an 
even worse situation whereby you have to turn patients away 
because of the present circumstances. The same patients who look 
at you as their last hope in life‟ (Santho 2008). 
 
The ARV moratorium was the forerunner in a series of cost curtailment 
measures which were implemented by all 31 public healthcare facilities in the 
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Free State on 24 November 2008. These reduced the services available by 
drastic measures, and terminated all outreach services (with the exception of 
oncology). Clinical admissions were limited to „dire need only‟, and at one 
hospital patients were instructed „to go home and phone to hear if a bed is 
available‟ (Free State Province Department of Health 2008). 
 
Two weeks after the moratorium was implemented officially, the Head of the 
Free State Health Department, Pax Ramela, issued a statement alleging that the 
moratorium was the fault of National Treasury for under funding provincial 
health programmes and forcing the province to implement cost curtailment 
measures. Ramela admitted that „the entry of new patients into the program has 
been delayed since the beginning of November‟, but denied that any treatment 
interruptions had taken place (Ramela 2008: 2). This was contradicted by 
messages from Free State healthcare workers, who notified the South African 
HIV Clinicians Society that they had run out of ARVs in the first week of 
November. 
 
Health Minister Hogan was quick to react to the Free State‟s ARV moratorium, 
committing additional funds to replenish drug stocks and dispatching health 
systems experts to the province. By 9 November, Hogan had arranged for the 
transfer of R9.5 million in emergency funds to the province to purchase ARVs. 
The Free State‟s MEC for Health, Sakhiwo Belot, admitted later that the 
additional funds were sufficient only to sustain existing ARV patients until the 
end of January 2009, but not to enrol any new patients (Belot 2009). He also 
stated that the funds were spent on alleviating the province‟s broader budgeting 
crisis, and not solely on the ARV programme, thus demonstrating the province‟s 
inability to ring-fence budgets for specific health programmes, and its chaotic 
shifting of funds from one budget line to another. 
 
 
Contributing factors to the Free State ARV 
Moratorium 
 
Poor financial management 
 
After the democratic transition of 1994, South Africa implemented a quasi-
federal political system with the division of the state into three spheres: 
national, provincial and local (Schneider and Stein 2001: 724, Wehner 2000: 
40).
 
In the South African health sector, national government develops policies, 
provincial governments are responsible for policy implementation and service 
delivery, and local governments are charged with the provision of primary 
healthcare (McIntyre and Klugman 2003: 108).
 
The Constitution mandates that 
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the three spheres of government have concurrent powers within the health 
sector and that they integrate their functioning to streamline service delivery. To 
finance the delivery of services at provincial and local government levels, South 
Africa has decentralised fiscal structures so that provinces and local 
governments may exercise greater autonomy in allocating resources between 
and within departments (ibid: 110).  
 
Provinces and local governments derive their funding from a combination of 
revenue from block transfers at national level and, on a smaller scale, through 
local taxation and revenue collection. The Public Finance Management Act 
prescribes that national legislation which entails service delivery in provinces 
must include projections of the financial implications for provinces (Wehner 
2000: 57). This gives legal recognition to the additional cost burden that 
provinces are required to bear when national departments enact new legislation. 
However, in practice, provincial and national budgets may not account 
sufficiently for new policy proscriptions, and national policies may not reflect 
the realities of provincial and local capacity or the feasibility of expanded 
service delivery (McIntyre and Klugman 2003: 108). 
 
South Africa operates on a three year „rolling budget‟ known as the Medium 
Term Expenditure Framework. When the Finance Minister presents the budget 
for the current financial year to Parliament, estimates are given for the 
following two years. Due to the relatively small sums of revenue raised 
provisionally, provinces rely on national government for approximately 97% of 
their budgets (Hassim et al. 2007: 88).  
 
There are two primary forms of transfer which national government allocates to 
the provinces: the equitable share, and conditional grants. The equitable share 
mandates an equitable distribution of national revenue between the national, 
provincial and local governments (Wehner 2000: 61). Equitable share funds are 
unconditional and, as long as they uphold the policy goals and constitutional 
obligations of national government, provinces may divide them between 
departments and programmes as they see fit. Provincial governments have little 
influence over the size of their allocated equitable shares, but they may 
determine how to allocate these resources across different sectors (McIntyre and 
Klugman 2003: 114).
 
However, accounting officers within different departments 
must manage their budgets in conjunction with provincial treasury. If a 
provincial department lacks the capacity to influence the budgeting process, its 
funding will suffer accordingly.  
 
Conditional grants, the other primary form of revenue sharing, are transferred to 
provincial departments to spend on specific programmes. Their purpose is to 
ensure that provinces have sufficient funds to implement programmes that have 
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been developed nationally. Conditional grants also supplement service delivery 
and compensate for resource provision that may benefit the inhabitants of more 
than one province. The conditional grant for HIV is known as the 
„Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Grant‟, and its objective is to finance a range of 
HIV interventions in provinces, including voluntary counselling and testing, 
ARV treatment, and the prevention of mother-to-child transmission (Republic of 
South Africa 2009, Hassim et al. 2007: 88). The Comprehensive HIV and AIDS 
Grant was initially established during the years of political conflict between key 
state actors over resource allocation for HIV programmes. Its purpose was to 
ring-fence funding for HIV services, particularly the provision of ARVs, and to 
thereby protect these funds from being absorbed into and reallocated within 
provincial health budgets.  
 
In spite of the elaborate system of grants and transfers to ensure the equitable 
distribution of funds across spheres of government and between provinces, in 
practice the system remains highly centralised at national level (Wehner 2000: 
71).
 
There is an abiding perception among provincial government officials that 
policy changes from national level are not supported adequately by budgetary 
changes (McIntyre and Klugman 2003: 113). The continual changes wrought by 
evolving health policies, human resource requirements and patient demand 
make it difficult for provinces to plan and adjust budgets accordingly.  
 
In the official explanation for the ARV moratorium, MEC Belot listed numerous 
reasons for the provincial Health Department‟s lack of funds which had resulted 
in the cost curtailment measures. These included: the increase in patient 
numbers; the Occupational Specific Dispensation (a wage increase for nurses 
discussed further below), the takeover of mortuaries from the South African 
Police Services; and the state of the global economy with rising inflation rates 
on medical goods and services (Belot 2009).
 
The findings of the Integrated 
Support Team corroborated Belot‟s claim that these unfunded mandates had 
exhausted province‟s health budget, resulting in a massive overspend. Using 
estimates of national expenditure and the Free State‟s budget statements, the 
report shows that National Treasury had under-funded the province‟s health 
mandates, including the Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Grant and the 
Occupation Specific Dispensation. The Free State‟s proportion of the national 
Comprehensive Grant for HIV/AIDS had decreased, despite the increase in 
overall funding for the grant increasing (Table 1). For example, in the 2005/06 
financial year, the Free State received 8.8% of the grant, a total of just over 
R100,000. By 2008/09 the absolute amount given to the Free State increased to 
nearly R200,000 but this represented just 6.8% of the total grant. 
 
Although the proportion of the HIV grant is approximately the same as the Free 
State‟s proportion of the total population (around 6%), the province had the 
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second highest antenatal HIV sero-prevalence in 2007 of 33%. It also covers a 
vast geographical distance, and provides services to patients from the Eastern 
Cape and Lesotho (Barron et al. 2009, Steyn et al. 2009: 1 – 6). These factors 
increased the demand for HIV and other health services in the province.  
 
From the financial year 2005/06 onwards, the Free State allocated 
approximately one quarter of the budget derived from provincial revenue and 
the equitable share to health, with a projected increase over the Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework (i.e. for the current and following two financial years). 
This projection remained fairly constant, with marginal increases from 2005/06 
to 2008/09, and adheres to established practices in the provincial division of 
budgets. 
 
But from 2004/05, the Free State Health Department had overspent its health 
budget each financial year. Finally, in 2008/09, provincial Treasury took 
measures to reign in the Health Department‟s overspending and changed the 
Health Department‟s cash delegations. Reduction of over-expenditure led to a 
rapid increase in outstanding accruals, which prevented facilities from 
replenishing stocks of medical supplies including essential medicines. This led 
to the rationing of health services and, shortly thereafter, the implementation of 
severe cost curtailment measures including the ARV moratorium. 
 
 
Inadequate human resources and infrastructure 
 
In the months preceding the Free State‟s enactment of the ARV moratorium, the 
provincial public health system came under immense strain due largely to weak 
financial management and mounting human resource shortages. By 2006, fewer 
than half of the approved ARV pharmacist posts in the Free State had been filled 
(Steyn et al. 2009: 4). Poor pay and difficult working conditions had worsened 
the human resources shortage (ibid). A lack of investment in the public health 
sector had failed to develop infrastructure and compounded the deterioration of 
existing health technologies. Infrastructure requirements for ARV provision 
include electronic ordering, stock management systems and storage. Despite 
national policy directives, more than two years after the Free State‟s ARV 
programme had begun, a number of facilities still lacked adequate drugs storage 
and computerised inventory and ordering systems (ibid). One reason for the 
province‟s inability to improve and upgrade information systems was a shortage 
of funds earmarked for this budget line item.  
 
In the context of changing budget priorities, it is notable that from 2005/06 to 
2008/09 there was a marked shift in the source of the province‟s over 
expenditure on health, from goods and services to compensation for employees. 
11 
 
In June 2007, government began to implement the Occupation Specific 
Dispensation (OSD), a revised salary structure for public service workers. The 
aim of the OSD was to improve remuneration for public service workers. 
However, the Free State‟s implementation of the OSD was beset by fiscal 
disorganisation. A lack of co-ordination between National Treasury, the National 
Health Department and the Free State Health Department meant that the 
additional amount that National Treasury allocated to pay for the OSD was 
based on a calculation from the equitable share, rather than the province‟s own 
human resource figures. This resulted in severe under-funding of the wage 
increase in the province.  
 
The lack of funds to pay salaries, combined with obstructive recruitment 
processes, meant that the Free State Health Department faced staff shortages 
which became more acute due to increasing service demands in the financial 
year 2007/08. In this year, the Health Department‟s takeover of forensic services 
from the police and the provincial roll-out of termination of pregnancy services 
were implemented without the creation of new posts (Barron et al. 2009: 62). 
Staff shortages therefore had a negative impact on service delivery in the 
province. Clinics were overcrowded, and lacked basic equipment and amenities, 




Weak M&E systems 
 
M&E systems can provide aggregate data to inform and guide the delivery of 
HIV prevention, care and treatment programmes, in addition to assessing the 
efficacy and impact of these (Nash et al. 2009: 58 – 62).
 
The National 
Department of Health and Treasury had supplied provinces with an extensive 
list of reporting indicators for their ARV programmes, but gave no guidelines 
regarding the provincial design and implementation of information systems to 
manage and monitor these (Schneider et al. 2010: 9). The report of the 
Integrated Support Team indicated that the Free State‟s M&E and information 
management systems lacked were weak and unco-ordinated. The national report 
by the Integrated Support Team found that, with the exception of the Western 
Cape, every other province faced similar inadequacies and structural 
weaknesses within its M&E systems. (Barron et al. 2009: 74 – 9).  
 
Ineffectual monitoring and information systems across national and provincial 
Health Departments and Treasuries resulted in poor formulation of targets and 
recording of the size of patient ARV cohorts (Barron et al. 2009: 76). As a 
result, the Free State initiated more patients onto treatment than planned, which 
led to an overspend of approximately R3.5 million per month (ibid: 41). When 
the ARV moratorium was implemented, provincial health officials therefore 
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argued that it was caused by the Free State‟s excellent performance in scaling up 
ARV coverage, because this had drained the province‟s funds from the 
Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Grant (Ramela 2008).
 
While these weaknesses 
in M&E systems are not unique to the Free State, when combined with the 
provincial Health Department‟s poor financial management, human resource 
shortages and bureaucratic malfunctioning, the result was the collapse of 
healthcare delivery in the province. 
 
 
Bureaucratic malfunctioning  
 
From 2005 – 2008, a number of important positions within the Free State 
Department of Health remained vacant or were filled only by acting managers, 
including the integral position of the Head of Department. To cope with this 
lack of managerial capacity, functions performed traditionally by accounting 
officers were centralised within the office of the Health MEC, and managers 
were unable to make decisions appropriate for their level of authority without 
deferring to this office. In spite of this, the Free State Health Department 
remained unable to curb its overspending. The Integrated Support Team 
recorded evidence of financial mismanagement, particularly regarding the 
reduction of variance across budgets. Rather than implementing changes at the 
operational level, the Health Department appeared to reduce variance amounts 
for different over- and under expenditure items through reallocating budgets. 
There was no clear alignment between annual performance plans, and budgets 
and performance plans were not updated once conditional grants and equitable 
share funds had been allocated, demonstrating the inflexibility of the Health 
Department‟s budgeting practices (Barron et al. 2009: 41). 
 
In the financial years prior to 2008/09, the Provincial Treasury had funded the 
Health Department‟s overspending through supplying additional cash flow. But 
in November 2008, the Department‟s overspending provoked the Provincial 
Treasury to withdraw delegations for the financial year 08/09 (mentioned above 
in the section on financial mismanagement). This change in the cash supply 
policy reduced the financial autonomy of provincial health officials, who could 
no longer access funds to pay for outstanding accruals. The Provincial 
Department of Health responded by curtailing services, including ARVs. This 
evoked protests by HIV advocacy groups, the Treatment Action Campaign and 
AIDS Law Project foremost among them, and generated negative news 
coverage. However, despite the assistance of the National Health Department, 
and the pressure of HIV advocacy groups to have the moratorium lifted, the 
province was unable to resume its delivery of routine healthcare until four 
months later in March 2010. 
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The Auditor General found that the Free State Department of Health did not 
have an audit committee in operation for the financial year 2007/08; that the 
internal audit function did not work according to an approved internal audit 
plan; and that it did not fulfil its responsibilities set out in Treasury Regulations. 
The Integrated Support Team also found that the previous year‟s external audit 
recommendations had not been implemented substantially, pointing to an acute 
lack of financial capacity within the provincial Department of Health and 
Treasury (ibid: 45). 
 
The pharmaco-vigilance and medical depot staff who were responsible for drugs 
management in the province worked in different clusters. This impeded their co-
ordination of drugs procurement, delivery and monitoring. The process for 
distribution of ARVs is outside of the normal drug supply chain. Pills are 
required to be packed specifically for individual patients onsite at the hospital or 
clinic. Lack of communication between the provincial medical depot and the 
chief pharmacist had compromised drugs distribution and resulted in drugs 
shortages and misorders. The Support Team found that the provincial 
Department of Health had not prioritised drug budgets. The moratorium on 
replenishing drug stocks was therefore implemented as a cost curtailment 
measure, despite adverse effects on patients. By 2008/09, the medical depot was 
losing proficiency in drugs procurement. Orders which were supplied within 2 
weeks in 2005/2006 were taking from 6 – 8 weeks to be supplied and that 
orders were only made once supplies had reached critically low levels rather 
than in advanced anticipation of need.  
 
 
ARV interruptions and extended waiting lists 
 
Late access to ARVs and poor adherence to treatment regimens are associated 
with increased mortality and drug resistance (Nachega et al. 2006: 78 – 84).
 
Spacek et al. (2006: 252 – 259) demonstrated that interrupting treatment for 
four days or more was associated with virologic failure, while Oyugi et al. 
(2007: 965 – 971) found that treatment interruptions of more than 48 hours 
allowed drug resistance to develop.
 
The lengthy waiting lists and treatment 
interruptions which characterised the Free State moratorium therefore provided 
the circumstances for patients to develop resistance to their treatment regimens, 
or to die before they were able to initiate treatment. 
 
Francois Venter, head of the HIV Clinicians Society of South Africa, explained 
in a letter to Health Minister Hogan that delays in treatment would have a 
„cumulative negative effect on the roll-out‟, with little chance that all 
backlogged patients would survive the wait (Venter 2008). Venter also estimated 
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that the moratorium was resulting in the additional deaths of 30 people from 
AIDS every day in the Free State.  
 
In an email to TAC, one Free State doctor explained that his clinic was set to 
run out of the drug lamivudine (3TC), by 15 December 2009. As lamivudine is 
one of three drugs in the public sector first-line ARV treatment regimen, a 
stockout of the drug would have impacted the majority of patients. The doctor, 
who wished to remain anonymous due to fears of victimisation by the 
Department of Health, told TAC that he had turned away thirty patients in 
urgent need of ARVs on a single morning on 10 November 2009 (private 
correspondence with Treatment Action Campaign). That same day, the Free 
State‟s chief ARV pharmacist notified the province‟s ARV pharmacists via email 
that she was unable to procure stocks of Kaletra. „To make matters worse‟, she 
wrote, „there is no alternative for Kaletra‟. Lopinavir/ritonavir (brand name 
Kaletra) is the protease inhibitor constituent of South Africa‟s second-line ARV 
treatment regimen, and is a mainstay of paediatric antiretroviral regimens.  
 
In journalists‟ profiles of Free State patients who had been turned away from 
clinics empty-handed, patients described their hopelessness and confusion about 
whether or not ARVs would ever be accessible consistently. One Health-e 
article recounted how a woman who had presented at Pelonomi Hospital after 
the ARV moratorium had officially been lifted was still unable to access 
treatment. She had been on the waiting list since October 2008. The nurse at 
Pelonomi told her to return in April 2009, but that ARVs would only be 
available by then if funds were sufficient. The woman told Health-e reporters, 
„Now I am ill. I want treatment. If I don‟t hear anything different after April, I 
will then give up‟ (Magamdela 2009).  
 
Access and adherence to ARV treatment is complex, and there are several 
determinants which affect a patient‟s success on treatment, including the 
patient/healthcare worker relationship, the clinical situation and the drug 
regimen (El-Khatib and Richter 2009: 412-413). In a letter to the South African 
Medical Journal about the Free State, El-Khatib and Richter wrote: „The 
moratorium will increase morbidity and mortality, but the loss of trust in the 
health system and the potential impact of the ARV crisis on existing patient 
adherence also need to be considered‟ (2009: 412).
 
Studies calculating the costs 
to patients of obtaining ARVs in South Africa have shown that patient access to 
ARVs entails considerable opportunity costs, and that this is an important factor 
in adherence (Rosen et al. 1997: 524 – 29, Veenstra et al. 2009: 12).
 
During the 
ARV moratorium, many patients were not put onto the ARV waiting list. They 
were instead told that they would only be added to the list once the moratorium 
was lifted, with a strong likelihood of loss to follow-up (AIDS Law Project 





Poor co-ordination between Provincial and National Health Departments and 
Treasuries resulted in the haphazard implementation of the moratorium and its 
continuation for four months. Due to South Africa‟s legislative requirements 
that National Departments oversee service delivery in the provinces, 
responsibility for the impacts of the ARV moratorium reside partly at the 
national level. At the provincial level, financial mismanagement, bureaucratic 
malfunctioning, human resources and equipment shortages, and inadequate 
M&E systems were the root causes of the ARV moratorium and the broader cost 
curtailment measures.  
 
The Free State ARV moratorium points to the structural deficiencies in South 
Africa‟s public health system. The province interrupted the procurement and 
provision of treatment due to a complex array of factors, primarily concerning 
the planning of budgets and their integration with accurate targets of patient 
demand for ARVs. In South Africa‟s provinces with the highest HIV prevalence 
and fewest health resources, long waiting lists continue to obstruct patient‟s 
access to ARV treatment (Fairall et al. 2008: 86 – 93, Ford et al. 2009, 1808 – 
1810). Direct political obstructions to South Africa‟s public provision of 
services for the prevention, testing and treatment of HIV are a thing of the past. 
Today, obstructions to ARV treatment and the delivery of comprehensive 
healthcare services are caused more broadly by health systems and 
infrastructural problems. These include a lack of financial capacity and weak 
oversight and co-ordination of budgets, human resources shortages, poor M&E 
systems, and deficient infrastructure. The improvement of these components is 
crucial to South Africa‟s continued expansion of ARV treatment programmes, 
and its sustainable delivery of other health and social services. 
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Table 1: National Conditional Grant to the Free State Province (Barron et 
al. 2009: 36)  
Financial 
year 
Total Conditional Grant to 
all Provinces (in thousands) 
Free State Provincial 
Allocation (in 
thousands) 
% Allocation of 
National Conditional 
Grant 
2005/06 R1 150 108 R100 874 8.8% 
2006/07 R1 616 214 R142 265 8.8% 
2007/08 R2 006 223 R153 646 7.7% 
2008/09 R2 885 400 R189 630 6.6% 
2009/10 R3 476 200 R235 792 6.8% 
  
Table 2: Allocation of the Free State’s Provincial budget to health 




Budget (in millions) 
Adjustment Health Budget (incl. 
Grants) (in millions) 
% allocation to 
health 
2005/06 9 359 3 118 24.8% 
2006/07 10 076 3 369 24.2% 
2007/08 11 281 3 744 24.5% 
2008/09 13 313 4 469 25.0% 
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